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ABSTRACT
This working paper aims at presenting,  discussing and developing  the issue of a 
constitutional  convention as a possible means to initiate a democratic  process of 
autonomous constitution making in Cyprus. Autonomous constitution making means 
opening a process rather than defining a final product at the outset. Accordingly the 
goal  of  this  paper  is  not  to  provide  extensive  and  comprehensive  solutions  to 
important  issues  of  the  Cyprus’  problem  in  general.  Instead  the  objective  is  to 
mention  the  crucial  issues  that  will  need  to  be  discussed  by  the  Constitutional 
Convention for Cyprus. Moreover, this paper outlines what must be the basic legal 
principles that guide this process and what could be the different steps towards its 
implementation. 
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1. Introduction
1. The aim of this paper, drafted under the sole responsibility of the Research 
Centre on Direct Democracy (c2d)1 after extensive peer review, is to present and to 
develop  the issue of a constitutional convention as a possible means to initiate a 
democratic process of autonomous constitution making in Cyprus. As an academic 
working paper, its sole intention is to open a debate among scholars, political actors, 
members of civil society and citizens in and outside Cyprus.
2. The basic idea of this democratic process is that the people of Cyprus, living 
up  to  the  basic  principles  on  which  the  European  Union  is  founded  –  liberty, 
democracy, human rights and rule of law – have a fundamental right to recover full 
sovereignty  and  to  put  an  end  to  all  legal  and  factual,  international  and  internal 
limitations  of  self-government  by  adopting,  for  the  first  time  in  history,  their  own 
Constitution. 
3. Autonomous  constitution  making  means  opening  a  process  rather  than 
defining  a final  product  at  the outset.  A democratic process consisting of  several 
sequences should enable the Greek, the Turkish and other communities in Cyprus, 
with the joint assistance and under the joint supervision of the EU and the UN, to 
overcome the present stalemate and to find means and measures that will eventually 
bring an end to a conflict that has lasted for too long and that threatens European 
integration, regional stability and international peace. 
4. This paper outlines what  must be the basic legal  principles that guide this 
process and what could be the different steps towards its implementation. 
2. Basic Legal Principles and their Interpretation
5. The process that would allow the Cypriots to finally draft and enact their own 
Constitution  has  to  be  firmly  anchored  in  the  basic  principles  upon  which  the 
international community,  the European Union and its member states are founded. 
These  principles  face  serious  challenges  in  the  context  of  the  past  and  current 
Cyprus conflict.
6. The process of autonomous constitution making is fully consistent with the UN 
Secretary-General’s firm belief “that the responsibility of finding a solution lies first  
and foremost with the Cypriots themselves”2. 
Principle 1:       Legal basis  
7. The  first  basic  principle  is  the  rule  of  law:  Any  process  of  autonomous 
constitution making needs a specific  and detailed legal  basis,  which sets out  the 
principles, defines the actors, indicates the steps and provides for the organizational 
1 Formerly University of Geneva (http://c2d.unige.ch), since September 2007 University 
of Zurich (www.c2d.ch).
2 Security Council Resolution 1789 (2007).
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and procedural rules. Re-unification cannot take place in a legal and constitutional 
no-mans-land.
8. In today’s Cyprus, this basic principle is not easily satisfied. The main difficulty 
stems from the  fact  that  neither  side  of  the  Cyprus  conflict  is  willing  or  able  to 
officially  recognize  the existence of  the other,  thus barring  the treaty  solution  for 
creating a legal basis for a constitution making process. 
9. Nor  seems  there  to  be  any  possibility  that  the  existing  constitutions  be 
amended,  separately  or  jointly,  for  creating  the  legal  basis  for  a  common 
constitutional convention. While the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus can 
only be amended with the explicit  and unanimous consent of all  communities and 
guarantor powers involved, a consent which as a result of the tragic events of the 
sixties and the seventies is impossible to reach, any kind of recognition of the “1983 
Constitution of the TRNC” by the Greek Cypriot and the international communities 
would amount to legalization of unlawful occupation. As both constitutions have been 
more or less imposed on the people of Cyprus by foreign powers, it seems difficult to 
rely on them for opening a process designed fundamentally to finally realize self-
government and sovereignty of that people.
10. It thus becomes apparent that maintaining and simply amending the existing 
treaties, constitutions and other normative acts cannot create the legal basis for the 
constitutional  convention.  As  a  new  paradigm,  the  Constitutional  Convention  for 
Cyprus would need to find and to establish its own legitimacy through a new set of 
democratically accepted rules.
11. This paper advocates the drafting, under the joint responsibility of the EU and 
the UN, of a “Charter for a Constitutional Convention in Cyprus” that would contain all 
substantive and procedural  regulations necessary to launch, pursue and conclude 
the process of adopting a new Constitution for Cyprus through the instrument of a 
constitutional convention. The Charter would be submitted to the people of Cyprus in 
a  referendum held  on  the  same day in  both  communities  of  Cyprus  and  would 
require the approval of a double majority of the voters in order to enter into force. 
Principle 2:      Popular assent  
12. The  second  constitutional  principle  is  democracy:  Popular  assent  is  a 
paramount requirement of a re-unification process. It means that the decisive steps 
of  this  process  must  derive  their  legitimacy  from  the  people  itself.  This  is  what 
sovereignty of the people is all about. 
13. The  constitutional  convention  is  by  its  very  essence  an  instrument  of 
democratic  constitution  making  that  has  been  successfully  employed  throughout 
history on all continents. The basic idea is that constitution drafting is not an ordinary 
matter that can be left to existing governmental bodies, self-appointed agents and 
foreign experts. Constitution drafting must be integrated in, and not separated from, 
the democratic political process. 
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14. A Constitutional Convention for Cyprus, democratically elected or appointed 
so as to reflect appropriately the will of the voters and the aspirations of civil society 
of  the  different  communities  of  the  island  should  have the  sole  responsibility  for 
drafting a new Constitution for Cyprus. 
15. In a divided country like Cyprus,  popular  assent requires a majority of  the 
voters within each community. The Constitutional Convention must gain the support 
of  the  people  of  Cyprus  through  separate  referendums  and  elections  held 
simultaneously in both communities of the island.
16. Popular  assent  is  thus  a  prerequisite  for  each  one  of  the  four  decisive 
momentums of the constitution making process. The people must first approve the 
Charter  creating  the  legal  basis  of  the  process.  The people  must  then elect  the 
Constitutional Convention for Cyprus according to the rules laid down in the Charter. 
Next,  the  people  must  ratify  the  new  Constitution  of  Cyprus  drafted  by  the 
Constitutional Convention. Finally the people must elect the state organs – a new 
Parliament, a new President – provided for by the new Constitution.
Principle 3:      Sovereignty  
17. The third basic  principle is sovereignty.  Sovereignty means independence, 
which is a prerequisite of both EU and UN membership. By claiming and asserting 
their  fundamental  right  to  give  themselves  their  own  Constitution,  the  people  of 
Cyprus have a unique chance to redefine their independence.
18.  The continuing presence of Greek and Turkish military forces in Cyprus, the 
Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the right of intervention in its internal affairs reserved to Greece, Turkey and 
Great Britain as the guarantor powers according to the Treaty of Establishment of 16 
August 1960, a relic of colonialism which has not been affected by the accession of 
the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, constitute severe limitations to the 
sovereignty of the people of Cyprus that need to be renegotiated on the basis of the 
new Constitution. 
Principle 4:       Respect of liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law  
19. Both the process that opens the way for a constitutional convention and the 
new Constitution of Cyprus that this convention is to bring into life must strictly abide 
by the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law 
upon which the EU is founded and which are common to the member states (Article 
6 TEU) and indeed to the international community.
20. The present state of affairs in Cyprus is thoroughly inconsistent with these 
principles.  Liberty,  democracy,  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  are  constantly 
threatened and seriously violated by the prevailing artificial separation of the people 
and of the territory of Cyprus into two systems, imposed and maintained by foreign 
intervention, each of which denying the other’s right to existence.
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21. The Constitutional Convention for Cyprus has the unique chance and historic 
responsibility  to draft  a new Constitution that  will  hopefully  re-unite  the people of 
Cyprus by overcoming the existing territorial,  religious and political  barriers in full 
compliance with international human rights and protection of minority standards and 
with strict respect for cultural and linguistic diversity.
3. Eight Steps and their Interaction
22. Firmly relying  on and implementing  the foresaid  principles,  the process of 
framing a new Constitution for Cyprus consists of a sequence of several steps each 
of which rests ultimately within the sole responsibility the people of Cyprus and their 
representatives. 
Step 1:             The Charter for a Constitutional Convention in Cyprus  
23. The Charter  for  a Constitutional  Convention in  Cyprus  is  something like a 
constitutional  act  of  sovereignty  that  is  designed  to  put  the  whole  process  of 
autonomous constitution making on firm legal grounds, from beginning to end and 
throughout all stages. 
24. As a political instrument, the Charter represents a paradigmatic link between 
the present constitutional pattern in Cyprus – divided, diverted and distorted by half a 
century of mutual ignorance and foreign intervention – and the future constitutional 
setting  that  has  the  aim  to  re-unite  the  Turkish  Cypriot  and  the  Greek  Cypriot 
communities in full respect of their political, cultural and religious identity. As it puts 
an end to the first pattern, the Charter breaks the way for the second.
25. As a legal document, the Charter is something like a road map, creating the 
possibility to put an end to the existing parallel chains of legality within the Greek and 
Turkish  Cypriot  communities  which  have  been  thoroughly  weakened  and  eroded 
since their foundation, in order to found a new chain of legality and give rise to a new 
legitimacy that culminates in the adoption of a new Constitution, the starting point of 
a  new  constitutional  order.  In  legal  terms,  the  Charter  is  nothing  else  than  a 
normative revolution, made necessary by the deadlock among the existing treaties 
and basic laws.
26. As a procedural norm, the Charter is required to set forth every single rule 
relating to and concerning the Constitutional Convention including its composition, 
election,  functioning,  organization,  tasks  and  duties,  responsibilities,  datelines, 
majorities,  quorums  and  many  more.  It  should  not  however  restrict  by  any 
substantive means the sovereign power of constitution making that belongs to the 
Constitutional Convention. The Charter, in other words, says all that is needed for the 
Constitutional Convention to exist, to convene, to discuss, to decide and to conclude; 
it  says nothing about the contents of the Constitution that is to be framed by the 
Convention. 
27. The difference between procedure and substance is decisive for answering 
the question of who is to draft the Charter and how. If the Charter were to contain not 
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only the former but also the latter or essential parts of it, we would be facing a typical 
chicken and egg problem: The body that adopts the product should also enact the 
instrument,  meaning that both the Charter and the Constitution would have to be 
drafted by the Constitutional Convention.
28. Procedural rules are of course by no means neutral. They quite naturally tend 
to shape and to canalize the substance in way that can be more or less discretely 
mastered  by  their  author,  thus  favouring  the  latter.  It  must  therefore  be  strictly 
avoided that the body, which drafts the Charter, has any direct stake in the outset of 
the constitutional debate that is to follow. This is why the existing political leaderships 
and administrations in Cyprus, and even less the foreign powers that have dominated 
the Cyprus conflict since its outbreak – United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey – should 
not be directly associated with the drafting of the Charter. The Charter is no “Annan 
Plan B”. It is a recipe that needs to be cooked and not a plate that can be served.
29. One basic rule, of procedural nature but with major substantive implications, 
must be provided for by the Charter itself, without any possibility of the Convention to 
change  it.  If,  for  any  reason  and  at  any  stage,  the  process  of  autonomous 
constitution  making  opened  by  the  Charter  should  collapse,  fail  or  stumble,  the 
different  communities  of  Cyprus  would  continue  to  be bound  by  the  pre-existing 
constitutional schemes and rules. The safeguard clause is intended to prevent abuse 
of this process as a means to achieve a goal that is not a product of the latter.
30. It is submitted that the Charter be drafted by an International Expert Panel, 
convened on the basis of this paper, that it be widely discussed by the international 
academic community and the public and that it be finally submitted to the political 
leaderships in Cyprus, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President 
of the European Commission. 
Step 2:             Referendum on the Charter  
31. The political leaderships of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, under 
the joint auspices of UN and the EU, shall organize a referendum on the Charter for a 
Constitutional Convention in Cyprus. The referendum should be held on the same 
day in both communities of Cyprus. A double majority would be required, consisting 
of a separate majority of the voters of each community, both approving the Charter. 
The UN and the EU are to supervise jointly and efficiently the referendum for the 
Charter campaign and the electoral operations and to provide financial assistance.
32. The first  question  is  to  decide  who  shall  define  the  electoral  body that  is 
allowed to take part in the referendum for the Charter. The answer is easy. It can 
only be the Charter itself, as it must set out, in one way or another, the conditions of 
its own coming into existence. 
33. The second  question  is  how to  define  this  electoral  body.  This  time,  the 
answer is far from easy, mainly because of the presence of settlers in the northern 
part of Cyprus. The alternative seems to be the following: 
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34. The Charter could leave it to each  community to define the electorate as it 
wishes,  in  full  respect  however  of  international  and  humanitarian  law  standards 
relating to elections. This means that the electoral body that is going to vote in the 
referendum for the Charter is likely to be composed differently in each  community, 
creating inequalities that might be problematic. This also means that it  will  be the 
responsibility of the political leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community to draw a 
line between the integrated and the non-integrated Turkish settlers and to exclude 
the  latter  from  the  electoral  body,  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions. This also means that members of foreign armed forces in both parts 
will have no right to vote.
35. Alternatively, the Charter could also define itself in all details the conditions 
under which voters would be allowed to take part in the referendum for the Charter, 
attracting so to say this power from the existing political leaderships. The advantage 
is  that  voting  conditions  would  be the  same in  all  parts  of  the  territory.  But  the 
enforcement of these conditions by authorities that do not necessarily favour them 
might cause serious practical and political problems.
36. The referendum on the Charter is the turning point of the whole process. If the 
people in one or in both parts of Cyprus vote No, the concept of a Constitutional 
Convention has failed. If the voters approve, the Charter comes into legal existence 
and is hence ready to perform its de-constructing and re-constructing functions with 
regard to the former and the future constitutional  order.  Only popular  assent  can 
legitimize the break of legality operated by the Charter. A victory of the Yes means 
that the people of Cyprus are ready for a new start in a new direction. 
Step 3: Election of the Constitutional Convention
37. The next step will consist of the election of the Constitutional Convention by 
the  voters  of  each  community,  according  to  rules  and  procedures  to  be defined 
entirely by the Charter. Besides the fact that the election should be held on the same 
day  in  both  communities  and  allow  the  designation  of  all  members  of  the 
Constitutional Convention by one single electoral move, a whole series of delicate 
questions must be answered by the Charter:
38. The Charter would first have to fix the total number of the members of the 
Constitutional Convention. A figure between 80 and 100 seems to be an appropriate 
range,  permitting  a broad representation  of  the  most  significant  segments  of  the 
political entities and civil societies of Cyprus without creating an oversized body. 
39. The Charter would then have to decide how many seats would be reserved 
for the representatives of the Turkish Cypriots living in the TRNC. At first glance, this 
looks like one of the trickiest questions. Maybe it is not. Be it a 20 – 80, 30 – 70 or a 
40  –  60 ratio,  each  side  would  have to  deal  and  to  compromise  with  the  other 
because at the end of the day the Constitution will have to be approved by a double 
majority within both communities. If for instance the majority of representatives of the 
Greek  Cypriot  community  would  systematically  impose  its  views  on  the  minority 
representing the other side, there would be little hope if any that the voters of the 
latter would ever approve it. The same of course is true the other way around: If the 
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Turkish  Cypriot  minority  would  dare  to  play  a  veto  power  game  in  view  of  its 
foreseeable  voter’s  opinion,  the  Greek  Cypriot  majority  could  hardly  convince  its 
community to abide by such an endeavour. The double majority rule applying to the 
constitutional referendum has in other words a preventive effect on the deliberations 
and  the  decision  making  process  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  forcing  each 
group or party to notice and to take into account the existence, aspirations and fears 
of the other. 
40. The  Charter  would  also  have  to  ensure  an  appropriate  presence  in  the 
Constitutional  Convention  of  the  traditional  Maronite,  Armenian  and  Latin 
communities. 
41. Then there is  the delicate question of  eligibility.  Are all  voters,  as defined 
either  by  each  constituency  or  by  the  Charter,  eligible  to  the  Constitutional 
Convention? Should an age limit  of say 25 be required? May Turkish Cypriots be 
candidates in the Greek Cypriot community? Could Greek Cypriots run for a mandate 
within the Turkish Cypriot community? Would it be possible for en emigrated Cypriot, 
living in the UK or in Greece, to be a candidate and to get elected? Is there to be but 
one decisive criterion, like residence, citizenship or ethnic origin, or should the three 
be somehow combined?
42. Incompatibilities  are another delicate topic.  While it  would  be excessive  to 
exclude  members  of  parliament  of  both  communities  to  sit  in  the  Constitutional 
Convention,  the  exercise  of  judicial,  governmental  and  top  level  administrative 
functions in either community should be incompatible with a Convention mandate.
43. The  Charter  must  also  define  the  electoral  system,  which  again  implies 
answering a whole set of questions. Should the two main communities be subdivided 
in smaller multi-member constituencies? Would this be done by the Charter itself or 
left  to  each  side?  Should  the  proportional  representation  be  combined  with  a 
preferential system? What are the rights of the voters? How the seats are distributed 
among the  communities? What quorum is required for participation in the second 
distribution? What method is used for the distribution of the remaining seats? How 
are vacancies to be filled? All these, and many more, questions must be addressed.
Step 4:            Organizing the Constitutional Convention  
44. Once elected, the Constitutional Convention of Cyprus would first have to get 
organized  in  order  to  be  able  to  accomplish  its  functions  efficiently  and 
independently. This again is a crucial point, which the Charter will have to deal with in 
all detail. 
45. Is  the  Constitutional  Convention  to  be  a  professional  body,  meaning  that 
during  its  existence  all  members  are  fully  dedicated  to  their  mandate  without 
exercising any other public or private office that could threaten their independence? 
Or would it be preferable to conceive membership in the Convention as a part-time 
activity,  according to a realistic  representation scheme in which  each one of  the 
various ethnic, professional, political and religious constituencies would be indirectly 
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present within the Convention? The answer to this basic question will have important 
financial consequences as to the appropriate recompense of membership.
46. Where will  the Constitutional  Convention convene,  have its committee and 
plenary meetings, its administration, its facilities, its formal seat? If it is in Cyprus, 
which would be preferable for symbolic, practical and financial reasons, where? In a 
building located in the Greek or Turkish Cypriot community? Could it be alternatively 
here  and  there?  In  the  buffer  zone?  Are  the  members  of  the  Constitutional 
Convention to be put under the physical protection of the UN armed forces or of EU 
officials, at least while sitting, at best all the time, including in their private life? What 
kind of privileges and immunities should be attached to the mandate? Or would the 
necessary independence be better protected if the Convention convenes in a neutral 
place outside Cyprus like Geneva or Oslo?
47. The  sovereignty  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  with  regard  to  the 
substantive issues implies its autonomy with respect to its internal organization. The 
Charter should therefore delegate to the Constitutional Convention itself the power to 
enact  an  autonomous regulation  providing  for  the  latter,  including  election  of  the 
Presidency  and  the  steering  committee,  formation  of  committees  on  selected 
substantive  issues,  voting  procedures,  decision  making  process,  appointing  of 
experts,  holding  of  hearings,  communication  policy,  a.s.o.  Some points,  such as 
majority rules and public access to the plenary sessions, should however be tackled 
by the Charter.
48. Organizing the Constitutional Convention also means to define its institutional 
relationship with the acting political leaderships of both Cypriot communities. This of 
course is a highly sensitive question. While the constitutional future of the people of 
Cyprus must lie exclusively in the hands of the Convention, because this is its only 
raison  d’être,  the  current  affairs  –  political,  economic  and  social;  international, 
national and local – must be taken care of by the political leaderships. The Charter 
will  have  to  provide  for  an  appropriate  system  of  pragmatic  cooperation  and 
separation of powers between the former and the latter.
Step 5:            Drafting of a new Constitution by the Constitutional Convention  
49. It is the very essence of the Constitutional Convention that it has but one task, 
which is a huge one: To draft a new Constitution for Cyprus. The new Constitution 
must  be  a  formal  constitution,  meaning  that  is  has  to  provide  for  specific  rules 
governing its amendment and revision. Nothing that it  fixes must be untouchable, 
meaning that a compromise reached at one point can be modified later, provided that 
the amending procedure defined by the Constitution be strictly observed. With regard 
to  its  substance,  the  Constitution  must  to  the  very  least  define  the  composition, 
competencies  and  functioning  of  the  main  state  organs,  that  is  the  executive, 
legislative  and  judiciary  powers.  It  must  provide  for  appropriate  decentralization, 
define citizenship and the rights and obligations attached to it, protect minorities and 
human rights, promote sustainable development, insure minimum social protection 
and much more. 
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50. The Charter, which is aimed to set out the rules governing the opening and 
the different stages of the constitution making process, should not otherwise restrict 
the full liberty of the Constitutional Convention to choose whatever political system it 
may prefer – presidential, parliamentary or combinations thereof – to find territorial 
solutions  by  an  appropriate  decentralization  scheme  –  in  districts,  regions, 
communes or whatever – and to work out schemes and procedures that will be able 
to effectively protect minority and human rights, in the interests of those who would 
have the last word: the voters of each community. 
51. The only legal  limit  of  constitution framing would be strict  compliance with 
European constitutional principles, international law and human rights standards, as 
well  as  EU  law.  Politically,  the  outer  limit  would  lie  in  finding  solutions  and 
compromises on government, decentralization and protection of minorities that would 
have a fair chance of being accepted, at the end of the process, by a majority of the 
voters of all communities of Cyprus. In that sense, the Constitutional Convention is 
sovereign, having the sole responsibility for striking the necessary balance among 
the conflicting  interests  of  its  various  communities,  religions,  political  parties  and 
segments of civil society. In other words, the Constitutional Convention will both allow 
and oblige the people of Cyprus to find their own way for solving their constitutional 
problems.
52. One point  that  will  have to  be tackled by  the  Charter  itself  is  time limits. 
Constitutional  conventions  cannot  sit  eternally.  The  Constitutional  Convention  for 
Cyprus would be given a limited time, say three years, for adopting a first draft of the 
Constitution. If it fails, it would be automatically dissolved. If the first draft is rejected 
by the voters in the constitutional referendum, it might be a good idea to give the 
Convention a second chance to work out, within one year, a second draft. If the latter 
is again repelled, the process would come to an end.
Step 6:             Advice and consent by the political leaderships  
53. Elected by the people, the existing political leaderships of both communities 
cannot be left out of the constitution making process that may eventually put an end 
to  the  very existence  of  the  entities  they are acting  for.  While  the  Constitutional 
Convention has validly deprived them of the power to directly shape the future status 
of Cyprus and its communities,  they must have their  say on the Constitution that 
redefines this status.
54. This is not to say that the political leaderships would have the right to formally 
amend the Constitution as it  has been drafted by the Convention.  Such a power 
would  openly  contradict  the very reason why the Convention has convened.  The 
wording of the Constitution, the working out of some solutions to the many existing 
problems and challenges of a re-united Cyprus, the sequencing of new processes 
that  will  bring  about  further  progress,  are  of  the  sole  responsibility  of  the 
Constitutional Convention. The political assessment of the Constitution however must 
be left to the existing political leaderships.
55. Each  community,  according  to  its  own  rules,  may provide  for  appropriate 
procedures  in  order  to  shape  and  to  express  the  decision  on  ratification.  While 
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approval by parliament might be possible and perhaps even desirable, a community 
referendum should be excluded.
56. The political leaderships should not however be given a veto power, enabling 
them to block the whole process and thus to prevent the draft constitution enacted by 
the  Convention  to  be  put  on  vote.  Such  a  power  would  put  the  acting  political 
leaderships above the democratic process of constitution making and transform the 
Constitutional Convention into a docile instrument of the former.
57. Whatever opinion the political leaderships may have on the draft constitution, 
they would have the possibility to address it  as an official  recommendation to the 
voters.  
Step 7:            Constitutional referendum on the new Constitution  
58. The new Constitution, as drafted by the Constitutional Convention and with 
the recommendation of the acting political leaderships, would finally be submitted to 
a referendum, according to the provisions of the Charter. Historically, the instrument 
of the constitutional referendum is a by-product of the constitutional convention. Only 
the people themselves can bring about the legitimacy needed for a new fundamental 
order.
59. Again,  a double majority would be required,  that of  the separate voters of 
each community. The double majority requirement will serve as a strong procedural 
safeguard to ensure that the Constitution will  effectively protect the rights of each 
community in a way that has a chance for being approved by the people of both. This 
will  put  the Constitutional  Convention  under  considerable  pressure to find and to 
work  out  a  new constitutional  system with  institutions,  rules  and  regulations  that 
would be appropriate to solve the Cyprus problem on a fair basis.
60. By approving the Constitution, the people of Cyprus will bring to an end the 
process that it had opened by ratifying the Charter and pursued with the election of 
the Constitutional Convention. The Convention will then be dissolved and upon entry 
into force of the Constitution, the existing administrations will be replaced by the new 
Unified  Republic  of  Cyprus,  or  whatever  solemn appellation  the  Convention  may 
haven chosen.  
Step 8:             Election of the new state organs  
61. The last stage of the process is the election of Parliament, of the President 
and/or of whatever state organs the new Constitution provides for.
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